





Murphy, M.  (2020) Public sector accountability and the contradictions of the regulatory 
state. Administrative Theory and Praxis, 42(4), pp. 517-530.  
(doi: 10.1080/10841806.2019.1700455) 
This is the Author Accepted Manuscript. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 

































Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
  




Public sector accountability and the contradictions of the regulatory state   
 




A substantial amount of research evidence has been gathered regarding the pathologies of 
accountability, but less attention has been paid to the reasons why such pathologies occur in 
the first place. The paper addresses this issue by exploring accountability in the context of 
Habermas’ theory of lifeworld colonization. The paper explores the value of the colonization 
thesis to modern day issues associated with the “regulatory state”, that form of state governance 
with surveillance and enforcement strategies at its core. It takes seriously the contribution that 
Habermas can make to the field of public administration – a contribution that can position the 
field in its broader context of democratic governance.  At the same time, it is accepted that 
there are limitations of the colonization thesis as an explanatory device, with the paper arguing 
that not all the consequences of accountability can be considered illustrative of a damaged 
communicative intersubjectivity. Specifically the paper turns to the concept of street-level 




In his classic text, Street-level bureaucracy (1980), Michael Lipsky argued that accountability 
in public service and political life is necessary and legitimate, as it served as the link between 
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bureaucracy and democracy (Lipsky, 1980, p. 160). Decades on from this statement, however, 
the evidence for such a link is increasingly tenuous. There has amassed a large body of research 
that suggests that accountability is often a weak link in the state armoury and can create more 
problems than it solves. Far from acting as an honest broker between bureaucracy and 
democracy, the accountability agenda has resulted in sets of “perverse effects” (De Bruijn, & 
Van Helden, 2006, p. 406) including the “loss of professionalism”, increased time pressure on 
time-poor professionals (Franco-Santos et al, 2012, p. 42) and damage to their capacity to 
engage with the public (Murphy and Skillen, 2015). Quality assurance mechanisms such as 
performance indicators are blamed for introducing “corrosive” practices  into the university 
sector (Schwier, 2012; Shore, 2008), and in some cases for having the opposite effect to that 
for which they are intended (West, 2010). More than anything, accountability has been blamed 
for encouraging institutional regimes of “symbolic compliance and impression management” 
(Visser, 2016, p. 79), leading to what Hood calls sets of “assurance behaviours” (Hood, 2011, 
p. 127) – behaviours that can be used by organisations and individuals “in their efforts to fend 
off blame” (Hood, 2011, p. 129).  
 
While the evidence has stacked up regarding the pathologies of accountability, less attention 
has been paid to the reasons why such consequences occur in the first place. This paper 
addresses this issue by exploring these pathologies via Jürgen Habermas and his theory of 
lifeworld colonization (1984, 1987). Briefly put, this theory suggests that the negative 
consequences of modernization, ushered in by a one-sided process of (instrumental) 
rationalization, manifest themselves in distorted relations that valorise measurable outcomes 
over the process of mutual understanding and communicative reason. Effectively, for 
Habermas, bureaucratic mechanisms of accountability are “tricky” (Barberis, 1998, p. 451) 
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because they have a tendency to overstep their limits, the red tape of political bureaucracy 
stifling the imperatives of an intersubjective world in which its remit does not govern. 
 
The paper explores the value of this colonization thesis to modern day issues associated with 
the “regulatory state”, that form of state governance with surveillance and enforcement 
strategies at its core (Majone, 1997; Moran, 2007; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). Specifically, the 
paper will explore Habermas’ potential contribution to debates over the consequences of the 
regulatory state in the guise of accountability regimes, consequences that have previously 
tended to focus on issues such as impression management and risk avoidance without 
necessarily situating these consequences in a broader theory of societal change.  Habermas’ 
theory of colonization is well placed to provide such a theory of societal change and this theory 
is used in this paper to detail one set of consequences around what I call ‘distorted relations’. 
The focus on relations in the regulatory state illustrates the damage such an approach to 
governance inflicts on what Habermas called ‘communicative’ rationality.                      
 
At the same time, it is accepted that there are limitations of the colonization thesis as an 
explanatory device, with the paper arguing that not all the consequences of accountability can 
be considered illustrative of a damaged communicative intersubjectivity. Specifically the paper 
turns to the concept of street-level bureaucracy for further refinement of Habermas’ ideas 
around governance and its relevance to theories of the regulatory state.  
 
The problem of bureaucracy in the regulatory state 
 
The tension between democracy and bureaucratic governance has long been a focus of attention 
of academics in political science and economics, but it is the field of public administration that 
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provides this focus with its normative core (Meier & O’Toole, 2006). This is a field heavily 
influenced by the work of Max Weber (1968), who viewed bureaucracy as a necessary 
component of any modern democracy. Bureaucracy for Weber underpinned a strong state (a 
condition he was much in favour of, particularly as regards Germany at the time), as well as 
providing a viable structure for the spread of modern capitalism. The rationality of efficiency 
and organisation offered by bureaucratic modes of government ensured that the potential for 
economic and social progress is maximised. The characteristics of bureaucracy such as office 
hierarchy, rigid rules and norms, precision, accuracy, clarity – these all made vital contributions 
to the hyper efficiency required in 20th century political and economic life.  
 
Such progress, however, comes at a cost, and that cost can be especially detrimental to 
institutional and professional autonomy. Weber once famously remarked that bureaucracies 
“can serve any master” (1946), meaning that bureaucracy could be used to control and 
dominate or alternatively it could be used to liberate, depending on who is in power. With 
bureaucratic administration comes domination – “every domination expresses itself and 
functions though administration. Every administration, on the other hand, need domination, 
because it is always necessary that some powers of command be in the hands of somebody” 
(Weber, 1954, p. 109).      
 
When it came to assessing the efficacy of bureaucracy, Weber was caught in a bind: he valued 
and saw the need for systems of formal rationality i.e., for characteristics such as calculability, 
predictability, efficiency, control, and their institutionalisation in bureaucratic modes of 
governance. These he saw as essential to managing the complexity of modern societies. Weber 
considered formal rationality as “superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the 
stringency of its discipline and in its reliability” (Weber, 1968, p. 337). But he also saw this as 
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the curse of modernity – the valorisation of efficiency and calculability sucked much of the 
freedom and meaning out of social life and left society in what he poetically referred to as the 
“polar night of icy darkness” (Weber, 2001, p. 123). This led him to characterise rationalisation 
more broadly as an “iron cage”.     
 
Much of the public administration literature has tended to focus on this domination tendency 
of bureaucracy, in which bureaucratic procedures and system are “considered a conspiracy 
against the public” (Meier & O’Toole, 2006, p. 7). In the eyes of these critics, bureaucracy is 
“synonymous with inefficient business administration, pettifogging legalism, and red tape” 
(Clegg, 2011, p. 207). This is also the case for what Travers (2007) calls the new bureaucracy 
of quality assurance, the mechanisms of accountability that have mushroomed in the era of the 
regulatory state. The research on accountability suggests that the iron cage of Weber’s 
nightmares has descended once again via the proliferation of auditing, evaluations, inspections 
and performance indicators (Diefenbach, 2009; Papadopoulos, 2010).       
 
   While such critiques highlight some of the downsides of modern forms of bureaucracy, little 
if any discussion has occurred that has encompassed a revisiting of Weber’s dilemma in the 
context of accountability regimes. Instead, the academic literature has devoted its energies to 
describing and classifying the workings of the regulatory state, particularly in the shape of new 
public management (Christenensen, Lie & Laegeid, 2007). While such analyses have their uses 
in debates over accountability, they would benefit from a more socio-theoretical approach to 
the topic of governance.  Given the way in which Habermas has reconstructed Weber’s 
approach to modernity and bureaucracy, his conceptual apparatus is an obvious choice for the 
task.    
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From labour commodification to lifeworld colonization 
 
Habermas’ conception of bureaucratic governance reflects his intellectual lineage, not only that 
of Weber but also the roots of the Frankfurt School in the theories of Karl Marx. Marx’s critical 
approach to social analysis aimed to identify the pathologies generated by capitalist 
modernization, an approach adopted by the Frankfurt School in their efforts to develop a critical 
theory of society. Two key pathologies identified by Marx were alienation and 
commodification (Marx, 1959). Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, key figures in the work 
of the early Frankfurt School, developed their own pathology in the shape of the “totally 
administered society” (1973) – an idea of an over-bearing reason that combined the worst 
effects of alienation, commodification as well as Weber’s iron cage.   
 
Habermas appropriated aspects of these analyses for his own work, but his analysis of the 
dysfunctions of capitalist modernisation manages to both update and also transform 
conceptions of capitalism and state governance. In devising his own conceptual apparatus 
Habermas tended not to engage with the dominant Marxist critiques of the state that were 
fashionable at the time. When he was developing these ideas, in the 1960s and 1970s, debates 
over the capitalist nature of the state were dominant in the critical sociology and political 
science literature. Marxist theorists such as Ralph Miliband and Nikos Poulantzas were 
prominent in these debates, seeking sophisticated analyses of the relation between the state and 
market - echoes of these analyse can still be found in contemporary Marxist political economy, 
a field that devotes much of its energy to assessing the impact of multinational corporation on 
nation state forms of democracy (Jessop, 2015). 
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While Habermas shared with Marx a concern over the unjust distribution effects of capitalism 
(Müller Doohm, 2010, p. 449), he was also concerned to avoid what he considered to be a form 
of analytical conflation when it came to the state-economy nexus. Habermas’ conceptual aim 
was to ensure that the political and economic realms retained their unique and distinct character 
while also crafting theoretical space for action-oriented approaches to political economy. To 
assist his aim, he developed a theory of steering media (a term he appropriated from other 
theorists, especially Niklass Luhmann), key amongst which were power and money. The 
introduction of this robust functionalist element allowed Habermas to deliver a reconstructed 
Marxist historical materialism which provide him with a welcome escape route away from 
deterministic approaches to theory. 
 
This reconfiguration also helped Habermas in its efforts to grapple with 20th century problems 
of public administration. This was especially true in his analysis of the welfare state 
compromise, an analysis developed with one of the key Marxist questions in mind: how did 
the capitalist system manage to avoid a working class revolution? As a partial response to this 
question, Habermas suggests that the welfare state compromise, one aimed at managing 
capitalist exploitation while alleviating its worst effects, went some way to quelling 
revolutionary favour among the working class. At the same, he envisaged significant problems 
with this compromise when it comes to the legitimacy of the state to govern. In his book 
Legitimation crisis (1976), Habermas theorises that legitimation crises result from nation states 
overstepping their limits. The greater responsibility states adopt over welfare services as well 
as consumption, the more likely it is that crises of social integration will take place in the 
lifeworld. As a result the state, if it cannot somehow adequately confront the pathologies of 
capitalist modernization, it ends up paying a price, and the “price for this failure is withdrawal 
of legitimation” (Habermas, 1976, p. 69).             
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The lifeworld, part of Habermas’ new two-level conception of society, was the site of this 
legitimation withdrawal. This conception afforded Habermas the opportunity to deliver an 
action-theoretic as well as a systems-theoretic analysis of the process of societal rationalisation. 
He uses the term lifeworld to signify the background consensus of everyday lives, which 
includes the taken-for-granted understandings of social life that guide people’s lives, while the 
system refers to the world in which political and market imperatives dominate; i.e., the state 
administrative apparatus (steered by power) and the economy (steered by money). This two-
level concept of society provides Habermas with the tools to examine the increasing autonomy 
of what he calls “systematically integrated action contexts” from socially integrated lifeworlds 
(1987, p. 305). 
 
This dual-perspective methodological reconstruction provided Habermas with the framework 
to tackle the core issue at the heart of Weber’s theory – bureaucratization and the iron cage of 
modern public administration. While Habermas relies heavily on Weber’s analysis of societal 
rationalisation and its troubling side-effects (1987, p. 301), at the same time he takes Weber to 
task for equating capitalist modernisation to societal rationalisation. Key to this critique is the 
fact that Weber’s take on the iron cage was guided by the restricted idea of purposive 
rationality. 
  
According to Habermas, Weber’s reliance on the model of the purposive-rational actor leads 
Weber to provide an inaccurate diagnosis of the times. In order to present what Habermas 
considers to be a more effective diagnosis, it is necessary to provide a substantial restructuring 
of Weber’s theory. This re-structuring was based on two grounds: first, Weber emphasised the 
idea of purposive rationality to the exclusion of other forms of rationality; and second, he 
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confused action theoretic and system theoretic concepts. To counter the first problem, 
Habermas proposes the introduction of the concept of communicative rationality ‘tailored to 
the lifeworld concept of society and to the developmental perspective of lifeworld structures’ 
(Habermas 1987, 305). 
 
The second problem was resolved by Habermas via his two-level concept of society – system 
and lifeworld; this offered an analysis of the process of societal rationalisation via both an 
action-theoretic and a systems-theoretic perspective. This dual perspective offered up a wholly 
new way of understanding bureaucratization: While for Weber, bureaucratization represented 
the institutionalisation of purposive-rational action, Habermas argued that bureaucratization 
“should be regarded as the sign of a new level of system differentiation” (1987, p. 307). 
Bureaucratization for Habermas was the anchoring of the steering mechanisms of the economy 
and the state – money and power, respectively – in the structures of the lifeworld.   
 
Habermas reconfigured this bureaucratization thesis in terms of a conflict between social and 
system integration, a distinction that highlighted the co-existence of two sets of relationships, 
one between actors and one between parts of the system. The conflict between these sets of 
integrative relations has implications for state governance and its effects on lifeworld contexts. 
It means, because sets of actions are no longer socially integrated, but rather take their cues 
from the system, social relations become divorced from actor’s identities. Increasing 
bureaucratisation has resulted in a heightened separation between social relations and the 
identities of actors in the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 311). 
 
Weber understood the trend towards bureaucratisation in action-theoretic terms. For him, the 
paradox of societal rationality lay in the relations between two different types of action 
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orientations; that is, value-rational action and purposive-rational action orientations. Habermas, 
however, argues that bureaucratisation and the paradoxes that arise from it should instead be 
understood in terms of a relation between two different types of societal integration, namely 
social and system integration. 
 
Phenomena related to the iron cage now count as “effects of the uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld” (Habermas 1987, p. 318). As the media of money and power function independently 
of language, they are not connected to the communicative structures of the lifeworld, which 
are dependent on language as the means of reaching understanding. As a consequence, these 
media allow the uncoupling of formally organised domains of action from the structures of the 
lifeworld, which in turn unleash their functionalist reason of system maintenance onto the 
lifeworld structures. It is this pathological side-effect of societal rationalisation that Habermas 
refers to as the “colonization of the lifeworld”. 
 
Alongside this analysis, Habermas takes care to emphasise the role of bureaucratization as an 
ordinary and to some extent legitimate component of modernization processes. (1987, p. 318) 
He thus makes a distinction between functional and dysfunctional forms of bureaucratization, 
as he needs to distinguish the normal mediatisation of the lifeworld from the pathological 
colonization of the lifeworld. For Habermas, it is only when the economic and political system, 
via the media of money and power, attempt to reify the symbolic structures of the lifeworld 
that pathologies occur. Only actions that align well with economic and political imperatives 
can be adopted by the steering media of money and power. These media, however, are out of 
place – dysfunctional - in areas such as cultural reproduction, social integration, and 
socialisation – the work of the lifeworld. Imperatives associated with money and power cannot 
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transplant themselves onto these forms of symbolic reproduction with “without pathological 
side-effects” (Habermas, 1987, pp. 322-323). 
 
It is this “systematically induced reification” (Habermas, 1987, p. 327) of the symbolic 
structures of the lifeworld that Habermas views as constituting colonization - his “malignancy 
thesis” as White calls it (2016, p. 195). The capacity to act communicatively and to fulfil the 
symbolic reproductive function of the lifeworld is under threat from systemic imperatives, 
which, via the media of money and power, reify those structures of the lifeworld that are based 
on communicative action. Habermas (1987, p. 326) terms this reification of everyday 
communicative practice a “one-sided rationalisation”, a restricted rationality ushered in by the 
process of capitalist modernization, a process with origins in “the growing autonomy of media-
steered subsystems, which not only get objectified into a norm-free sociality beyond the 
horizon of the lifeworld, but whose imperatives also penetrate into the core domains of the 
lifeworld” (1987, p. 327). 
 
Relational distortion and the regulatory state 
 
With this reformulated scenario one can start to put together a different, more nuanced take on 
bureaucracy. Now political regulation in the form of accountability mechanisms can now be 
assessed from two different angles – one in which the instrumental rationality of efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness must take up space alongside the capacity of this form of steering to offer 
communicative value. The value of transparency and surveillance as a form of public 
answerability must be judged alongside its capacity to overshadow and damage forms of 
intersubjective communication – orientations to mutual understanding as opposed to means-
end calculations.        
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Applying this thesis of a one-sided rationality run amok to the field of public sector regulation, 
one can start to make claims as to its relevance – does evidence of colonization exist? Where 
do dysfunctional forms of bureaucracy manifest themselves? An appropriate area to highlight 
in this regard is the intersubjective communicative aspects of the public sector - the manner in 
which these damaging effects get played out in the key relations across fields such as health, 
education and social work. More specifically, this would entail a study of the relations between 
professionals and end users – for example relations between teacher and student, doctor/nurse 
and patient, and social worker and client.  
 
One study that engages with this type of front line relations is that of Steijn and van der Voet 
(2017), as part of their focus on the job satisfaction of public sector workers. Their research 
suggest that public sector professionals are more sensitive to burdensome rules and procedures, 
due to the fact that the red tape of accountability acts “as a hindrance stressor that thwarts the 
realization of prosocial aspirations” (Steijn & van der Voet, 2017, p .1). The stress of 
surveillance and compliance measures has resulted in a set of negative effects on their 
interactions with the public. Because of the red tape of accountability, employees “devote less 
time to their clients and have less opportunity to have an impact on their lives” (Steijn & van 
der Voet, 2017, p .12). Distorted relations in this case relate to the impact of red tape on both 
to the quality and quantity of interactions with their clients.  
 
Viewed through the prism of the colonisation thesis, these findings can be understood as the 
result of an over-bearing instrumental reason narrowing the space and opportunity for 
communicative practices to emerge.  Such a take on relational distortion as a consequence of 
colonisation is a plausible one, and one that has already been discussed by researchers keen to 
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put Habermas to work in applied professional settings (Murphy, 2017). A key point of 
reference for this approach is Blaug’s notion of the “distortion of the face to face” in relation 
to social work practice (Blaug, 1995). Social work for Blaug is a “dual aspect” activity, as it 
by necessity combines instrumental with communicative rationality (1995, p. 427). But the 
increasing bureaucratization of social work had resulted in an imbalanced agenda, as it has 
embedded the “systematic colonization of communicative practices by instrumentalism”. He 
illustrates this form of colonization using the example of casework supervision, which 
historically has been more communicatively oriented. According to him, casework has become 
more directed towards time management and protocol: “As our communicative practices 
become colonized, we lose the ability to form our opinions and beliefs through discussion” 
(Blaug 1995, p. 429).  
 
Although this argument regarding social work is supported by others researchers in the field 
(e.g., Cooper, 2010; Hayes and Houston 2007; Sinclair, 2005), it is the sectors of health and 
education that have generated the most evidence of the colonisation thesis resulting from 
bureaucratic scrutiny. Much of the focus here has been on the damage accountability has done 
to issues of trust. Brown (2007) refers to the instrumentalising of trust, specifically regarding 
the transformations taking place in the British NHS. According to him, the bureaucratic drain 
on medical professionals, “dramatically reduces the time available to sit down with the patient, 
answer questions and provide comfort and reassurance” (Brown 2007, p. 10). Using Habermas’ 
theoretical base, Brown argues that levels of trust are threatened by the rationalisation of 
healthcare “through the neglect of the communicative act by which the patient’s best interests 
are articulated, agreed upon, and by which the professional can affirm him/herself as both 
caring and competent” (Brown 2007, p. 12).  
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A range of other Habermas-inspired critiques of the health sector take to task the introduction 
of consumer accountability and its negative impact on patient/health professional interactions 
(e.g. Donnelly et al., 2013; Godin et al., 2007; Mikkelsen et al., 2008). Similar arguments can 
also be found in education, where concerns have been raised over the encroachment of 
consumerism into the professional-non-professional relationship (see Aper, 2002). Such a view 
arguably reflects those of a large proportion of education professionals, and their attitudes 
towards the dysfunctionality of hyper-instrumentalist logic applied to education, particularly 
via testingi. 
 
The damage done to relations of trust resulting from new bureaucratic methods of governance, 
is compounded by the effects new bureaucratic modes of regulation have on the moral agency 
of street-level bureaucrats. This was the focus of Zacka’s study When the State Meets the Street: 
public service and moral agency (2017). Zacka explores the ways in which what he calls the 
‘moral lives’ of street-level bureaucrats - the frontline social and welfare workers, police 
officers, and educators - are realigned and reconstituted in the face of increased regulatory 
frameworks. Combining insights from Lipsky and Weber alongside his original ethnographic 
fieldwork (he worked as a receptionist in an urban antipoverty agency), Zacka argues that 
frontline workers are faced with ‘impossible situations’ (2017, p. 200) with competing claims 
to their authority and expertise weaving their way into procedures, regulations, protocols but 
also into forms of tacit knowledge and professional practice, altering the DNA of front-line 
services. This has pathological side-effects which help corrode the moral integrity of public 
services. Teachers for example become indifferent or hostile to their students in the face of 
competing demands and what appear as attacks on their professional integrity. When faced 
with bureaucratic pressures, street-level bureaucrats are effectively forced to continually adopt 
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reductive and unsatisfactory conceptions of their own professional responsibilities, ‘each by 
itself pathological in the face of a complex, messy reality’.   
  
Zacka talks of impossible situations as a kind of ‘performative self-contradiction’ (2017, p.  
227), one that street-level bureaucrats find themselves in when attempting to reconcile their 
own sense of professional identity, and worth in the face of contradictory demands. The 
impossibility arises when professionals such as teachers, struggle to retain their moral identity 
and integrity ‘while continuing to systematically and consciously perform actions that are 
contrary to it (pp. 227-228). He summarises it thus: 
 
You cannot expect me, as a teacher, to keep doing what I need to do to meet the 
accountability requirements. As a teacher, (according to how I understand this term and 
myself), it is impossible for me to do so. Of course, I, as an individual, could still perform 
the actions that you require of me. But I would effectively no longer be a teacher in my own 
eyes. What I cannot do is hold on to the identity and to the actions at the same time (quoted 
in Zacka, 2017, p. 228).           
 
This breakdown of moral agency at the front-line has significant implications for state 
legitimacy. The front-line of public services, where state and street-level forms of bureaucracy 
meet, represents government's human face to ordinary citizens, and is a significant indicator of 
the state’s duty of care and of its moral guardianship. The state’s capacity to protect its citizens 
find its litmus test in this moral integrity. Front-line services are also important from a 
conceptual point of view as they offer a street-level approach to understanding bureaucracy, 
governance and democratic life, a ground-up approach that illustrates how fluid and complex 
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governance is in the lives of both professional services and those ordinary citizens who avail 
of them.          
 
Given that the dominant focus across these studies is on the colonising tendency of instrumental 
rationality, it is worth pausing to consider the alternative theory – colonisation via 
communicative reason, especially as it has implications for how one understands the perceived 
benefits of accountability. Although untested and lacking strong empirical support, it could be 
the case that such an alternative theory could be built off the back of the colonization thesis. 
Habermas himself recognises this potential in Between Facts and Norms (1996), in which he 
suggests that communicative reason can also overstep the mark and dominate in areas without 
recognising its own limitations. He was acutely aware of the “anarchist consequences” 
(Gregoratto, 2015, p. 539) of his theory of communicative action, of a form of reason that failed 
to acknowledge societal complexity and institutional reality.       
 
Such an argument could tentatively be applied to the communicative element of much of the 
accountability agenda and the desire for justification and answerability – i.e., transparency.  
There is an almost fetish-like search for transparency in public sector governance – a trend 
visible for example in the health care sector internationally – where there is a great demand for 
new forms of audit, control, and reporting systems which “reveal and visualise health care 
processes and outcomes” (Blomgen & Sahlin, 2007, p. 155). This desire to reveal and make 
visible process of legitimation and justification may constitute pathological consequences in 
themselves, of a dysfunctional communicative element in the structures of governance.  
 
Expanding concepts of bureaucracy and accountability  
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The application of Habermas’ colonization thesis helps us expand our conceptions of 
bureaucracy and the downsides of accountability, especially when the relation between theory 
and practice is drawn closer together, as per above. This turn has a number of advantages: it 
allows for a greater degree of scrutiny of the pathologies of modernization; it updates Weber 
in relation to for new forms of bureaucratization, and it brings a critique of political economy 
into the analytical frame. But while this application of Habermas is an important contribution 
to the theory of public administration, it is an application that comes with strings attached. The 
theory of lifeworld colonisation is quite abstract and is built on a complex conceptual apparatus 
of communicative action – its relation to forms of (professional) practice cannot be taken as a 
given or easily applied to distinct workplace contexts and policy reforms. It is also the case that 
Habermas deployed the theory to capture pathologies in the context of lifeworld activities, such 
as damage to forms of cultural reproduction: pathologies of governance were not necessarily 
in his sights. This is partly because he was more concerned with the ills of capitalist 
modernisation than the perils of regulatory governance. 
    
As a result, his focus on cultural reproduction never translated into an interest in the lifeworld 
of professionals working in state bureaucracies. This is a missed opportunity, as this shift in 
perspective can provide an alternative view of bureaucracy as mediated by professionals – by 
those who interact with the public and deliver public services. From this perspective, one can 
take a more detailed look at bureaucratic and regulatory governance as they are practiced at the 
level of the “street” – as detailed by Lipsky in Street-level bureaucracy. Street-level 
professionals are in a position to “make policy” through their ability to exercise judgement and 
use discretion when they engage with the public (as teachers, nurses, social workers, etc). 
Working at the level of the street provides them with an important mediating function when it 
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comes to the demands of state-level bureaucracy, providing them with a priceless autonomy 
over how they implement policy directives in their interactions with members of the public. 
       
Lipsky positioned this intersubjective dimension – the relations and communications that occur 
between people – as a key component of the work of street-level bureaucrats. It is also a 
dimension at the heart of Habermas”s theory of communicative action. The essence of street 
level bureaucracy is that it requires professionals to “make decisions about other people” 
(Lipsky 1980, p. 161), a requirement that positions professionals as producers of policy (Hupe 
& Hill 2007, p. 280). This conception of policy production at the level of the “street” provides 
an alternative to more traditional systems-level approaches to government regulation and 
control. Alongside this, a theory of street-level bureaucracy creates a conceptual space via 
which to examine how professionals such as nurses manipulate official policy in the context of 
their relationships with the public – an aspect ignored by Habermas. Although Lipsky was 
aware that street-level bureaucrats operated within the context of significant external 
constraints, their position at the level of the street afforded them a position of real influence.   
 
Incorporating the street-level into the analytical framework surrounding bureaucratic 
governance also has the added value of highlighting the existence of other regulatory 
mechanisms that act in tandem alongside the overbearing state-economy apparatus. One of 
these highlighted in the literature is the role of law – again a subject of significant interest for 
Habermas (Murphy, 2005). Recent decades have seen the spread of a litigation culture in 
countries such as the US and the UK, with members of the public increasingly seeking recourse 
to the law to appeal or complain, or to achieve compensation (Allsop & Jones, 2008). The 
increasing tendency of people to resort to litigation suggests that recourse to the law is seen as 
a more immediate form of taking public services to account. Numerous aspects of public-sector 
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work have been affected by the spread of a litigation culture, with the health, police and 
education sectors seeing steady rises in the number of lawsuits (Furedi & Bristow, 2012).  
 
It could be argued that this increase in forms of legal accountability on the part of the public, 
could be a function of a broader legitimation crisis, a crisis that pits the state against its own 
citizens. Whether or not this is the case, it is evident that this development has implications for 
public sector work. The author’s own work examined the prevalence of legal forms of 
accountability in the public sector and their impact on professional work (Murphy and Skillen, 
2018). The evidence indicates that the mechanisms of quality assurance, designed to document 
and measure quality, can also act as mechanisms of legal exposure for professionals. The 
findings evidence the conflicting effects of evidential exposure, with the evidential 
requirements of accountability constituting a double-edged sword: evidence providing a 
platform for calling individuals and institutions to account, while also opening up professionals 
to liability exposure. The evidential nature of accountability mechanisms, as Michael Power 
previously argued, increases exposure to legal risk (Power, 1997). 
 
As a key tool of the regulatory state, accountability tends to magnify legal risk in public sector 
professions, as evidential exposure uncovers incompetence and lays the blame at unchecked 
professional discretion and judgement. This form of bureaucracy brings with it a culture of 
suspicion, and this culture, as well as the strategies of containment it encourages among 
institutions, is difficult to disengage from once established. The magnification of legal risk 
compounds this culture, one in which the capacity to cover one’s tracks and avoid legal risk 
become all important.  
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Concerns over this form of overregulation, as well as the role of professional discretion, 
illustrate the importance of incorporating the professional level into our understandings of 
accountability. They also offer a useful way of addressing limitations in Habermas’ conceptual 
apparatus and the incapacity of the colonization thesis to include the professional sector into 
the theory of system-level steering. This indicates that the dual methodological approach 
favoured by Habermas works only in certain scenarios, and needs further refinement to better 
represent modern forms of political governance. After all, the debate over accountability and 
its consequences is to a great extent a product of boundary disputes – who gets to make 
professional decisions, where does judgement and discretion lie and to what extent should it be 
deployed? Regulatory oversight seeks to discipline and manage professional autonomy but 
there needs to be a greater understanding of the consequences of this oversight as well as the 




Bureaucratic forms of regulation have their benefits and it would be unfair to dismiss these 
offhand in the desire to categorise bureaucracy purely as ‘red tape’. This was not the intention 
of Weber, and the same can be said for Habermas. There are functional elements of bureaucracy 
that have become indispensable in the modern world, and it is wise to remember that 
bureaucracy provides an efficient answer to increasing societal complexity via an 
organisational form “premised on the ethical values of universalism and meritocracy” (Clegg, 
2011, p. 206). At the same time, it is important to consider the tensions that exist between 
bureaucracy and democratic imperatives, and the work of Habermas has helped to illuminate 
these tensions in a way that does justice to the early work of Weber. His work also points us 
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away from the minutae of performance criteria and efficiency savings and towards a broader 
focus on the question: how do we manage modernity? (Clegg et al, 2011). 
   
That said, Habermas does not have the last word on the pathologies of bureaucracy and 
accountability, and this paper has endeavored to explore his contribution in the context of 
others socio-theoretical ideas, in this case street-level bureaucracy. Building conceptual bridges 
between set of ideas helps to assess the accuracy and value of abstract theory in practical 
contexts, a process Habermas himself would no doubt agree with. He is after all a master of 
hybridization, an intellectual strength which is no more evident than in the two volumes of The 
theory of communicative action. Here he expertly weaved together a complex theory via 
measured critiques of Durkheim, Weber, Marx and Mead, among others (Murphy, 2017).  
 
Preaching the benefits of hybridization is an important activity when it comes to the theory-
method relationship, as too often researchers approach theories as if they represented the final 
say on social issues. This form of theoretical fetishism is to be avoided, as the most effective 
research applications of theory adopt a critical stance, opening theory to critique while 
combining it with other socio-theoretical concepts. At their best they also aim to ‘test’ theory 
against practice: the examples included in this paper, from education, health and social work, 
illustrate the utility of Habermas to analysis of public sector reform agendas, but also suggest 
that no one theory (no matter how comprehensive) can manage to explain in full the complexity 
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